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Free Trade in Books—The 1878 Royal Commission on Copyright 
 
 
 
Barbara Lauriat 
 
Introduction 
 
The doctrine of free trade dominated Victorian political discourse for decades, including 
debates about copyright law. But professed free trade advocates could and did disagree 
profoundly on the question of copyright. Some saw it as an illegitimate restriction on trade, 
while others viewed it as a mode of enforcing a natural property right. Why did the 
application of free doctrine to copyright policy result in such widely divergent positions on 
the proper scope and purpose of copyright law? This article attempts to answer that question 
by focusing on Britain’s Royal Commission on Copyright, which reported in 1878.1  
Examining different perspectives of copyright law exhibited by Commission members and 
witnesses, with many presented in the dress of free trade doctrine, illustrates the extent to 
which political ideologies are not predictive of individual or collective views on copyright 
policy.  
 Free trade had emerged as a strong movement within the liberal programme in Britain 
by the early nineteenth century.2 It was still central to political culture at the time when the 
Commission held its meetings in the 1870s,3 and several of the key witnesses and members of 
the Copyright Commission grounded their arguments in the economic doctrine of free trade, 
                                                          
1 See generally, Barbara Lauriat, Revisiting the Royal Commission on Copyright, JOURNAL OF WORLD 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (forthcoming 2014) for a discussion and critique of treatments of the Royal 
Commission on Copyright in modern scholarship in copyright history and publishing history.  
2 ROBERT LEACH, POLITICAL IDEOLOGY IN BRITAIN 23, 39 (2009); GEORGE M. YOUNG, PORTRAIT OF AN AGE 50 
(1936). 
3 MARTIN DAUNTON, WEALTH AND WELFARE: AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF BRITAIN 1851-1951,  
206 (2007). 
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particularly as it was expounded by the intellectual and political leaders of the Manchester 
School.4  
 The widespread influence of free trade doctrine in the mid-nineteenth century cannot 
easily be overstated. To Victorians in the  second  half  of  the  century,  “Free Trade had become 
a  habit  of  mind.”5 The Manchester School, a political movement led by founders of the Anti-
Corn Law League Richard Cobden and John Bright, captured the minds of many influential 
politicians and public figures of the day. Cobdenism   “was at once a body of doctrine, a 
powerful and highly organised movement for reform and a significant element in the growth 
of  a  great  political  party.”6 Their followers applied their economic credo with religious zeal, 
and indeed to a great degree free trade doctrine was informed by moral and religious 
principles.7 As Fifoot observed, until the early 20th century,  in  England  “Free Trade remained 
the orthodox creed, and heresy, though noisy,  was  as  yet  ineffective.”8 Indeed,  after  Cobden’s  
death in 1866, a private London club was formed and named for him, with a membership 
dedicated to furthering free trade doctrine. Unlike other London clubs, the Cobden Club had a 
publishing arm dedicated to producing and distributing his speeches and writings and those of 
like-minded others. The attachment to Cobden was sentimental as well as religious and 
political; fifty years after the repeal of the Corn Laws, a free trade periodical attempted to 
foster  a  movement  to  wear  blue  cornflowers  in  Cobden’s  memory.9  
                                                          
4 While one might refer to the political and economic position of the free traders as a laissez-faire doctrine, the 
term laissez-faire was used infrequently by the mid-Victorians. Benjamin Disraeli himself coined the expression 
‘the  school  of  Manchester’  to refer to Cobden and his ilk in an 1846 debate. ROBERT BLAKE, DISRAELI 231 
(1966).  
5 YOUNG, supra note 2, at 50.  
6 ARTHUR J. TAYLOR, LAISSEZ-FAIRE AND STATE INTERVENTION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 29 (1972).   
7 “The  vision  of  free  trade  leading  inexorably to the establishment of international peace and harmony became 
elevated  in  Cobden’s  mind  into  a  quasi-religion.”  GEOFFREY R. SEARLE, MORALITY AND THE MARKET IN 
VICTORIAN BRITAIN 199 (1998); LEACH, supra note 2, at 39. 
8 CECIL FIFOOT, ENGLISH LAW AND ITS BACKGROUND 187 (1932).  
9 Sampson Morgan, The Free Trade Jubilee. Why the Blue Cornflower should be worn in memory of Richard 
Cobden, in 4 A HISTORY OF THE FREE-TRADE MOVEMENT IN ENGLAND (Augustus Mongredian ed. 1897).  
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  But   “free   trade” in nineteenth-century Britain encompassed a wide variety of 
positions. It could, but did not always, entail laissez-faire policies.10 The very popularization 
of political economy and free trade doctrine had led to an over-simplification of many of its 
tenets and a glossing over of the profound disagreements of many of its supposed adherents.11 
The Copyright Commission is an example of this diversity of views within free trade 
doctrine. As Paul Saint-Amour observes,   “if the 1876-1878 Commission debates teach us 
anything, it is that the rubric of free trade could shelter completely  adverse  viewpoints.”12 
Roughly, one might predict that an individual who favoured strong protection of 
private property and free markets might also favour the strong protection of copyright as 
property with fewer government limits on the scope and duration of that property. But such 
an individual might instead view copyright law as government intervention creating 
monopolies that interfere with the free market. An individual with socialist leanings might be 
more   sympathetic   to   the   government’s   regulation   of   the   market   through   copyright   law. 
Conversely, a socialist might be more concerned with the limitations of placing proprietary 
control on information in private hands and want cheap literature to be widely available. 
Ideological labels provide little guidance when it comes to copyright law.  
 The Royal Commission was appointed by the Government in 1876 with the broad 
remit of inquiring into the law of copyright.13 Its membership came from a variety of 
backgrounds including politicians, economists, and gentleman from the arts; it included 
individuals representing a range of the interests affected by copyright legislation.14 Lord John 
Manners, the civil servant and economist Sir Louis Mallet, the novelist Anthony Trollope, the 
                                                          
10 LEACH, supra note 2, at 39.  
11 SEARLE, supra note 7, at 38–39.  
12 PAUL K. SAINT-AMOUR, THE COPYWRIGHTS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE LITERARY IMAGINATION 87 
(2003).  
13 A Royal Commission on Copyright was originally appointed in 1875 but was dissolved due to the death of its 
Chairman.   
14 It  could  therefore  fall  into  the  category  of  a  “representative  commission.”  Barbara  Lauriat,‘The Examination 
of  Everything:’  Royal  Commissions  in  British  Legal  History 31(1) STATUTE LAW REVIEW, 24, 30-32 (2010). 
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composer Sir Julius Benedict, the jurist, philosopher, and journalist James Fitzjames Stephen, 
novelist and Member of Parliament Edward Jenkins, and the historian and biographer James 
Anthony Froude were all members. The Commission conducted dozens of hearings over the 
best part of two years before producing its 1878 report, which diagnosed the current law as 
“wholly destitute of any sort of arrangement, incomplete, often obscure.”15  
Once it had acknowledged that reform of some kind was necessary, the Commission 
had to recommend domestic   reforms   and   provide   guidance   for   the   Government’s  
international and colonial policy on copyright. Many of the debates on the Commission 
centered on whether the reforms should be particularized or whether a more dramatic 
overhaul of the copyright regime was necessary, particularly with regard to the Colonies. The 
Board of Trade had responsibility for copyright and patents at the time, and its 
representatives appeared before the Commission with a dramatic proposal to replace 
copyright--colonially and perhaps domestically--with a mandatory system of royalties. 
Politically, this could only be achieved if copyright were deemed not to be a proprietary right. 
Inevitably, knotty questions about the nature of property were raised as being of vital 
importance. The question of whether copyright was a property right or a mere-state granted 
privilege loomed large.  
Writing on the nature of copyright law the nineteenth century, T.E. Scrutton found the 
Commission’s  seeming contradictions to be symptomatic of the complex nature of copyright 
law itself. 
We have a commission, appointed by a Conservative Government and presided 
over by a Conservative peer, recommending a form of legislation with regard to 
literary property which is denounced as the most pernicious communism when 
applied to land; and, while the measure of our earlier history, concerning 
“forestallers   and   regraters,”   and   fixing   the   price   of   bread   and   other   material  
necessaries, are considered as monuments of the obsolete errors of our less 
enlightened ancestors, we find the same commission in effect advising that the 
                                                          
15 ROYAL COMMISSION ON COPYRIGHT, ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE LAWS AND REGULATIONS RELATING TO 
HOME, COLONIAL AND FOREIGN COPYRIGHTS; REPORT, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE vii (1878) [hereinafter RCC 
Report, RCC Minutes]. 
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price of literary commodities should be fixed by the state. A subject which causes 
such divergence in controversy, and leads to such startling results, clearly 
deserves the most careful investigation, to be conducted on a method as purely 
scientific as possible.16 
 
Scrutton noticed the anomalies that arise when copyright debates are examined through a lens 
of political thought. Copyright policy sat uneasily within the framework of his basic 
understandings of conservative and socialist ideology. To demonstrate some of the 
“divergence in controversy”   and   explore some of the “startling results” that Scrutton 
identified more than a century ago is the intention of this article. 
 The father of political economy Adam Smith had given tacit approval to copyrights 
and patents in 1776 in The Wealth of Nations.  
When a company of merchants undertake, at their own risk and expence, to 
establish a new trade with some remote and barbarous nation, it may not be 
unreasonable to incorporate them into a joint stock company, and to grant them, 
in case of their success, a monopoly of the trade for a certain number of years. It 
is the easiest and most natural way in which the state can recompense them for 
hazarding a dangerous and expensive experiment, of which the public is 
afterwards to reap the benefit. A temporary monopoly of this kind may be 
vindicated upon the same principles upon which a like monopoly of a new 
machine is granted to its inventor, and that of a new book to its author.17 
Thus, Smith’s   recorded   observations   on   copyright   law   are limited and provided little 
guidance for his nineteenth-century successors. Copyright and patents were seen as a sui 
generis legal oddity to be considered on their own terms. 
 While copyright was generally viewed as a subject removed from politics and 
political economy, strong political and economic views did sometimes lead the holder to 
strong views on copyright. Radical free trader Robert Andrew Macfie became sceptical of 
copyright and other forms of intellectual property as he became convinced they were contrary 
to classical liberal ideas of political economy.18 Yet, radical American libertarian Lysander 
                                                          
16 THOMAS E. SCRUTTON, THE LAWS OF COPYRIGHT 1–2 (1883).  
17 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, vol. V, 119 (1776, 
5th edn. 1904). 
18 ROBERT A. MACFIE, COPYRIGHT AND PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS, vol. 1 (1879). See also Charles Oppenheim, 
Robert Andrew Macfie, Patents, Copyright, Libraries and Legal Deposit, 4 INTELLECTUAL PROP. Q. 383, 386–
87, 391–96 (1998).  
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Spooner wrote a treatise calling for perpetual copyright, also drawing on classical liberal 
ideas of political economy.19 Harriet Martineau, author of Illustrations of Political Economy 
(1832), a great popularizer of political economic thought in the mid-nineteenth century, saw 
copyright law as an expression of natural justice. She had assisted lawyer and politician 
Serjeant Talfourd in the effort to expand and lengthen the duration of copyright protection 
that eventually resulted in the 1842 Copyright Act.20 She felt betrayed, however, by her hero 
Macaulay when he delivered his famous speech before the Commons on the copyright bill.  
 Macaulay famously presented copyright as a necessary evil to prevent the greater evil 
of patronage, but he disapproved of term extension beyond what was absolutely necessary.21 
As  Macaulay’s  nephew and  biographer  asserted,  “never has any public man, unendowed with 
the authority of a Minister, so easily moulded so important a piece of legislation into a shape 
which so accurately accorded his own views, as did Macaulay the Copyright Act  of  1842.”22 
Talfourd’s  original proposal, influenced and supported by poet William Wordsworth, would 
have extended the term to life of the author plus sixty years.23 Instead, the 1842 Act 
established the first post-mortem copyright term, but extended it only to forty-two years or 
life plus seven years, whichever was longer.24  
 Macaulay’s   critical   assessment   of   the   bill   was   grounded   both   in   his   position   as   an  
author himself and his adherence to utilitarian principles in determining the optimal scope 
and term of the proposed copyright.  He labelled copyright a “monopoly,” a necessary 
measure to encourage authorship and publication, but one that should extend no further than 
it  must  to  remain  effective.  “The principle of copyright is this. It is a tax on readers for the 
                                                          
19 LYSANDER SPOONER, THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OR AN ESSAY ON THE RIGHT OF AUTHORS AND 
INVENTORS TO A PERPETUAL PROPERTY IN THEIR IDEAS (1855). 
20 CATHERINE SEVILLE, LITERARY COPYRIGHT REFORM IN EARLY VICTORIAN ENGLAND: THE FRAMING OF THE 
1842 COPYRIGHT ACT 176, 182–83 (1999).   
21 Thomas B. Macaulay, Speech to House of Commons, Feb. 5, 1841, in SPEECHES, POEMS, & MISCELLANEOUS 
WRITINGS (THE WORKS OF LORD MACAULAY) 667 (1898). See also SEVILLE, supra note 20, at 31–32, 60–67.  
22 GEORGE OTTO TREVELYAN, LIFE AND LETTERS OF LORD MACAULAY 433 (1911). 
23 SEVILLE, supra note 20, at 18.  
24 Copyright Act, 1842, 5 & 6 Vict., c. 45 (Eng.). 
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purpose of  giving  a  bounty  to  writers.”25 Thus, he plainly rejected the natural property rights 
arguments; copyright should exist simply because utility demanded that authors have a means 
to  support   themselves  and  patronage  was  undesirable.  Macaulay’s  grudging  and conditional 
approval of copyright law and cautious approach to its term was adopted by many other 
Liberal free trade-advocates in the following decades.   
 In Martineau’s Autobiography, however, she described the reaction of some of their 
ilk who were appalled  by  Macaulay’s  position  on  copyright. He had, in her view, “associated  
himself discreditably...with  the  copyright  bill.” 26 She continued: 
What could have been the inducement to [Macaulay] to talk such nonsense as he 
did, and to set at naught every principle  of  justice  in  regard  to  authors’  earning,  it  
is impossible, to me and others, to conceive. Nothing that he could propose,--
nothing that he could do, could ever compensate to him for the forfeiture of good 
fame and public confidence which he seems to have actually volunteered in that 
speech. He changed his mind or his tactics afterwards; but he could not change 
people’s   feelings   in   regard   to  himself,   or  make  any  body  believe   that  he  was   a  
man to be relied upon.27 
 
 But  Macaulay’s  rhetoric  of  copyright as a monopoly was to persist in the following 
decades. Influential utilitarian philosopher and political liberal John Stuart Mill was broadly 
supportive of patent and copyright. In his Principles of Political Economy, he briefly 
addressed patents and copyrights, arguing that they should not be condemned as monopolies 
by advocates of free trade. He expressed his disapproval, primarily on moral grounds, of 
attempts to challenge the economic foundations upon which the patent and copyright laws 
rested. 
It is generally admitted that the present Patent Laws need much improvement; but 
in this case, as well as in the closely analogous one of Copyright, it would be a 
gross immorality in the law to set everybody free to use a person's work without 
his consent, and without giving him an equivalent. I have seen with real alarm 
several recent attempts, in quarters carrying some authority, to impugn the 
principle of patents altogether; attempts which, if practically successful, would 
enthrone free stealing under the prostituted name of free trade, and make the men 
                                                          
25 5 Feb. 1841, 56 Parl. Deb., H.C. (3d ser.) 341–60 (U.K.). 
26 HARRIET MARTINEAU, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 265 (2007).  
27 Id. at 265-66. 
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of brains, still more than at present, the needy retainers and dependents of the 
men of money-bags.28 
 
Rather than protection being granted as a   necessary   evil,   in   Mill’s   view,   the absence of 
protection for authors would itself be  a  “gross  immorality”. 
 Years later, the novelist, playwright, and copyright activist Charles Reade29 also wrote 
disapprovingly about Macaulay’s  influence  on  the development of copyright law, challenging 
the   “copyright is monopoly”   trope. Echoing the words of Mill, he opined,   “but for 
Macaulay’s  rhetoric,  and  his  popular  cry  ‘Monopoly,’  Parliament  would  have  refunded  us our 
property  for  sixty  years….[Free Trade] is a foolish and inapplicable phrase. Free trade is free 
buying and  selling,  not  free  stealing.”30 
  On the other side of the political spectrum, the protectionists—the opponents of free 
trade doctrine—were themselves conflicted on the subject of copyright. Radical American 
protectionist Henry Carey opposed international copyright agreements on the grounds that 
America needed cheap literature, and he was suspicious of copyright more generally because 
he thought it rewarded  the  “middle men” he found so detrimental to society. In his view, it 
benefited most those who clothed the ideas of others in their own expression rather than 
rewarding those who produced the original ideas.31 A British pro-protectionist newspaper 
reacted against free trade attacks on copyright, arguing that aristocratic patronage was the 
best mode of obtaining high quality literature, but that copyright as it existed was better than 
a   royalty   system.   “The Free-traders of the present day are not content with the removal of 
protection from what we eat, drink, and wear; they would have a free trade in literature; they 
would do away with patronage; they would abolish copyright; they would make the author 
                                                          
28 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, vol. V, 25 (1848, 7th edn. 1909). 
29 For  additional  background  on  Reade’s  involvement  with  the  Royal  Commission  on  Copyright,  see  Barbara  
Lauriat Charles  Reade’s  Roles  in  the  Drama  of  Victorian  Dramatic  Copyright, 33 THE COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF 
LAW AND THE ARTS 1 (2009).  
30 CHARLES READE, The Rights and Wrongs of Authors, in READIANA 111, 131 (1896).  
31 Henry Carey, Letters on International Copyright, Philadelphia (1853), in PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT 
(1450-1900) 10–13, 23 (Lionel Bently & Martin Kretschmer eds. 1853) available at 
http://www.copyrighthistory.org. See also ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM 
GUTENBERG TO GATES 309 (2010). 
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entirely dependent on public favour.”32 This was an attempt by the paper to place copyright 
within the framework of traditional, land-focused, nineteenth-century Tory protectionism. 
Literature was at its best, ran this protectionist argument, when the aristocrats recognized and 
rewarded quality. Patronage was probably preferable to copyright, but copyright was better 
than relying entirely on public favour through a system of royalties.  
 Liberal jurist and law writer Scrutton himself approved of copyright, but after 
examining the purpose and foundation of copyright, he described the nature of the law as 
essentially communistic:  
Literary and artistic productions are treated as property, but that property is 
created in, and limited by, the interests of the community. Strictly dealt with, it 
should be limited until further limitation defeats its own ends. This of course is 
nothing  else  than  reversion  of  a  man’s  property  to  the  community  on  his  death,  a  
system which was one of the first steps by which individual property was carved 
out of the property of the community, and which is one of the suggestions of 
Communism or Socialism at the present day. I do not point this out as an 
objection to the system, for I think it the right one, but rather that its true 
character be seen.33  
 
Yet Froude, who shared his mentor Thomas Carlyle’s   scepticism   of   the   free   trade  
extremists, thought the Board  of  Trade’s royalty-based alternative to copyright law was 
far more socialistic than the existing proprietary copyright regime. Asking 
provocatively  whether  “the Board of Trade has been converted to Socialism?,” Froude 
observed that the Government was not prepared to set prices for necessities like food 
and  clothes  but   the  Board  of  Trade’s  proposal   to   set  mandatory   royalties  was  akin   to  
setting prices for books.34   
 These examples, and many others, demonstrate that arguments for and against strong 
copyright protection are liquid enough to be moulded into contradictory political frameworks. 
Despite this malleability, they also illustrate why one cannot easily argue that copyright is a 
                                                          
32 THE LANCASTER GAZETTE, AND GENERAL ADVERTISER FOR LANCASHIRE, WESTMORLAND, YORKSHIRE, & C. 
4 (May 25, 1850). 
33 SCRUTTON, supra note 16, at 290–91.  
34 James A. Froude, The Copyright Commission, 304 THE EDINBURGH REVIEW 153 (1878). 
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wholly extra-political issue. Arguments in favour of the proposal and arguments against 
could each draw from principles of free trade-based political economic theory. Then, as now, 
the blunter tools of classical liberalism tend to be of little use in clarifying or resolving knotty 
copyright law controversies.  
 This article specifically examines the positions of witnesses Farrer, Macfie, and 
Spencer, all free trade advocates and witnesses before the Royal Commission, and those of 
Commissioners Froude, Mallet, and Fitzjames Stephen. Farrer was sceptical of copyright and 
in favour of moving to a royalty system; Macfie was even more radically anti-copyright. 
Mallet was an ardent free trader and great friend of Farrer, whose dissent from the majority 
Report provided an economic argument against copyright based in his own conception of 
value that is still cited today. Yet, Herbert Spencer, whose name has become almost 
synonymous with extreme nineteenth-century classical liberalism, was in favour of strong 
copyright protection and his arguments as a witness, along with those of T.H. Huxley, proved 
highly damaging to the positions of Farrer, Macfie, and Mallet.  
 Froude was one of the Commissioners least sympathetic to free trade doctrine and 
most   vocal   about   author’s   rights—his position represents a sceptical counterpoint to the 
ardent free traders. Fitzjames Stephen was a political enemy of Farrer, and he is now 
recognized as an important conservative philosopher. His ultimate conclusions on copyright 
seem, despite his antagonism to Farrer as a witness, to have common ground with those of 
Farrer and Mallet—differing where his reservations about democratic principles and the 
desirability of cheap books took hold. Thus, this article provides an exploration of several 
individuals’  carefully-constructed views on copyright and how they were informed by their 
underlying political positions in a historical context. While it becomes clear that the 
application of free trade principles—or any other political ideology—to inform copyright law 
policy is by no means straightforward and can lead different people to opposite conclusions, 
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this analysis also demonstrates how views on copyright are not apolitical, but can be, and 
often are, informed by broader political ideologies.  
 
Free Trade and the Book Trade in the Nineteenth Century 
For a vast imperial power like Victorian Britain, questions of trade held enormous political 
significance. The influential Anti-Corn Law League was founded in 1838; in the 1840s, the 
ideal of widespread free trade took firm hold in Britain. The protectionists were thwarted, and 
for about fifty years,  free  trade  doctrine  “held the field as an unassailable dogma of economic 
policy,”35 shaken only by the depression of 1880.   
 The economic theories articulated by Cobden and Bright extended well beyond tariffs 
on agricultural products; free traders kept  an  eye  out  for  “monopolies” wherever they might 
be found. To some, various forms of intellectual property were inherently suspect due to their 
monopolistic nature.  For  the  free  traders,  “monopoly”  was  a  dirty  word:  the antithesis of the 
competitive market that free trade was intended to create. Not that they were all in agreement 
as to the definition of monopoly. As publisher Edward Marston, a witness before the 
Commission, explained:  
A Quaker was once bitten by a dog. Said the Quaker, “Friend, I will not kick 
thee; I will give thee a bad name. I will call thee bad dog!”  A rheum in the 
Quaker’s  nose  made  bad sound like mad. So, the little boys took up stones and 
cudgels,   shouting   ‘mad   dog,’   and   pursued   the   poor   animal till he died. In like 
manner Mr. Farrer and Sir Louis Mallet are bitten with the idea that the present 
system of publishing is a bad one. They, though grudgingly, throw a sop to 
authors,  but   the   ‘parasitic  growth  of   the  publishing   interest’  with  which  authors 
are   ‘so   inextricably   intertwined’   is   strongly   denounced,   under   the   cry   of  
‘monopoly.’36 
 
 Free trade was more than a laissez-faire attitude to trade itself, it encompassed a 
particular understanding of human character and the nature of society; adherence to free trade 
                                                          
35 ALBERT V. DICEY, LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW & PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND DURING THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY 24 (1914). 
36 EDWARD MARSTON, COPYRIGHT, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF A PUBLISHER 
31 (1879). 
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doctrine   was   a   “moral statement.”37 “Free trade in books” predictably became one of the 
goals of the free trade movement, but it was not immediately clear what this goal entailed.38 
Should Britain grant copyrights to foreign authors even though their countries granted no 
rights to British authors? Should it seek to enter into international agreements? Or should it 
simply stop treating copyright as a property right? The government imposition of “a tax on 
readers,” with the unfortunate side-effect of discouraging the salubrious activity of reading, 
was deemed by many free traders a suspect procedure, even if they agreed with the desired 
end of producing a national literature and an educated public. Complicating the matter was 
confusion about the existing laws and the idiosyncratic nature of the Victorian book trade.  
As Mill himself observed, the book trade had traditionally been self-governing system 
grounded   in   custom   where   “notwithstanding the active spirit of rivalry in the trade, 
competition does not produced the natural effect in breaking  down  the  trade  rules.”39 
 In the early nineteenth century, the book trade in Britain had settled into an unusual 
model, much of it dependent on sales of high-priced novels to circulating libraries.40 The first 
private subscription libraries appeared in the 1740s and were in regular use by the 1760s.41 
Both the popularity of the novel as a literary form and the popularity of circulating libraries 
as a mode of distribution grew together, and the two were increasingly interdependent.42 
Supplies were kept low and prices high.43 Under this publication and distribution model, 
                                                          
37 DAUNTON, supra note 3, 206–07. 
38 For example, while not directly related to questions of the effects of copyright, calls for free trade in books 
arose in the 1850s in relation to the retail price-enforcing efforts of the Booksellers Committee. See JAMES J. 
BARNES, FREE TRADE IN BOOKS: A STUDY OF THE LONDON BOOK TRADE SINCE 1800 (1964). 
39 J.S. MILL, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, vol. I, 301 (1848, 3rd edn. 1852).  Barnes observes that 
this edition was published shortly before the 1852 controversy over retail price-fixing.  Supra note 38,at 130.   
40 For a discussion of the power of the circulating libraries in the novel market, see JOHN FEATHER, A HISTORY 
OF BRITISH PUBLISHING 150–59 (1988); GUINEVERE GRIEST, MUDIE’S CIRCULATING LIBRARY & THE 
VICTORIAN NOVEL (1970). 
41 MARJORIE PLANT, THE ENGLISH BOOK TRADE 264 (1939); Simon Eliot, From Few and Expensive to Many 
and Cheap: The British Book Market 199-1890 in SIMON ELIOT AND JONATHAN ROSE, A COMPANION TO THE 
HISTORY OF THE BOOK, 291, 297-99 (2009). 
42 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NOVEL, vol. II, 640 (2011).  
43 GRIEST, supra note 40, at 79-81.  
DRAFT 
13 
 
book prices rose steadily from the late eighteenth century through the first twenty-five years 
of the nineteenth.44  
 The English book trade was to change dramatically over the course of the nineteenth 
century,45 with the 1850s arguably representing a “great turning-point in the history of the 
English  book  trade’s  relationship  with  the  mass  public.”46 Technological developments, such 
as the steam-printing press, social and political movements, increased literacy rates, and 
improved transatlantic communication all contributed to a significant reduction in book 
prices in the 1850s.47 But there was already some movement from within the trade to counter 
the trend of selling few, expensive books as early as 1826. Charles Knight and his Society for 
the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge showed that publishing cheap copies of new works could 
be financially viable, and by 1850, cheap pocket editions were sold in railway bookstalls.48 
The practice of serialization of novels in periodical literature also became widespread after 
the  success  of  Dickens’s  Pickwick Papers in 1836-37.49 To obtain the most desirable books, 
however, in the first half of the nineteenth century, a subscription to a circulating library, 
such  as  the  dominant  Mudie’s and its railway-based competitor W.H. Smith, was necessary, 
and it could take quite a long time to gain access to a popular new book.50  
The term of copyright was extended to twenty-eight years or the life of the author by 
statute in 1814, and the scope of copyright gradually expanded to cover musical and other 
artistic productions through caselaw and legislation. After five years of lobbying by Serjeant 
Talfourd,51 the 1842 Act established the first post-mortem copyright term, extending it to 
                                                          
44 PLANT, supra note 41, at 414. 
45 Eliot, From Few and Expensive to Many and Cheap, supra note 41, at 291.  
46 ROBERT ALTICK, THE ENGLISH COMMON READER: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE MASS READING PUBLIC 294 
(1957).  
47 AILEEN FYFE, STEAM-POWERED KNOWLEDGE: WILLIAM CHAMBERS AND THE BUSINESS OF PUBLISHING 1820-
1860, 1-8 (2012).  
48 BARNES, supra note 38, at 33; PLANT, supra note 41, at 414–15.   
49 See NORMAN N. FELTES, The Production of a Commodity Text: The Moment of Pickwick, in MODES OF 
PRODUCTION OF VICTORIAN NOVELS 1 (1986).  
50 GRIEST, supra note 40, at 82.  
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forty-two years or life plus seven years, whichever was longer.52 The copyright bills proposed 
were controversial, with many high-profile supporters and critics from the worlds of politics 
and letters.53 At the same time as these debates over the optimal term of copyright were 
taking place, the goal of free trade was taking hold of English political thought; consequently, 
free trade doctrine became increasingly important to discussions of publishing and copyright 
reform.54 Macaulay’s  1841  speech, for example, questioned the extent to which the scope and 
duration of copyright protection could be justified on grounds of utility.55 It was initially 
unclear how free trade doctrine could apply to books, and whether they could and should be 
treated like any other commodity.   
 In 1829, major booksellers and publishers met to set retail and trade prices, and an 
organisation known as the Booksellers’ Association grew out of this arrangement.56 
Booksellers took action against those of their number who undersold their product, 
preventing competition and keeping the prices artificially high.57 When in 1848, the 
Booksellers’ Association attempted once again to fix prices, the booksellers were accused of 
collusive pricing and blocking competition from the market.58  
 Opposition to the Booksellers’ Association came from those competing booksellers 
who wished to undersell the dominant firms and also from the free trade movement, which 
had gained considerable momentum by that time.59 The issue, which became known as the 
“Bookselling Question,” attracted a great deal of attention from the press and public and 
divided the publishing profession.60 A number of publishers were opposed to the practices of 
                                                          
52 Copyright Act, 1842, 5 & 6 Vict., c. 45 (Eng.). 
53 See generally SEVILLE, supra note 20. 
54 Id. at 23–24. 
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price-fixing, such as John Chapman.61 But the dominant firms, such as William Longman, 
who had had been   Chairman   of   the   Booksellers’   Association,62 and Richard Bentley 
remained strongly in favour of setting book prices.63 
 The Government appointed a committee to examine the question of books and free 
trade, and many authors and politicians joined the debate relating to the complex relationship 
between books and free trade.64 Were books a commodity like any other? Did free trade 
apply to books? The Committee resolved that it did, and deemed the   Booksellers’  
Association’s  practices  opposed  to  free  trade.  Their  resolution  had  the  support  of  Macaulay,  
Cobden, Wilkie Collins, Carlyle, Dickens, Gladstone, and John Stuart Mill.65 Herbert 
Spencer submitted a letter to The Times arguing against the retail pricing of books,66 and 
Gladstone was particularly vocal his objections to the monopolistic practices of the 
booksellers.67 Under   the   pressure,   the  Bookseller’s  Association   disbanded   in   1852   and   the  
price-fixing stopped. This, in turn, led to several decades period of crisis and decline for the 
bookselling trade—the state in which it was found by the Copyright Commission.68 
The manner of printing and distributing books and the collusive practices of book 
sellers were not the only factors cited as contributing to the unsatisfactory situation. The 
copyright system itself has sometimes been blamed for its role in perpetuating the system of 
expensive books and circulating libraries that kept book purchasing out of the reach of many 
private individuals.69 Books in English were more expensive in England than those sold 
                                                          
61 BARNES, supra note 38, at 32.  
62 Id. at 49.  
63 Id. at 32. 
64 FEATHER, supra note 40, at 146. 
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elsewhere, particularly in jurisdictions where English authors were unable to obtain copyright 
protection. As Board of Trade representative T.H. Farrer would testify before the Royal 
Commission on Copyright, the price of a first edition of Daniel Deronda in England was 
42s., in Canada, under an Act allowing for colonial reprints, editions cost 6.s. 3d, he 
calculated that the price in the United States was the equivalent of 11s. 6d., and a German 
Tauchnitz edition was 6s. 8d.70  
The vast discrepancy in book pricing across borders arose primarily from the dearth 
of international copyright agreements in the nineteenth century--also a subject for the 
attention of free traders.  British books printed in America, where publishers paid nothing for 
the rights, were necessarily much cheaper than British books printed in Britain or American 
books printed in America. Copyright arose as a right protected within national boundaries, 
without much thought to international application, but it was at this time that the limitations 
of effective protection only within a single nation became apparent.71 By the 1830s, a 
Continental market for English-language books had arisen, and unauthorized copies of the 
works of British authors published abroad--as well as some printed with the consent of the 
authors--began to find their way back onto British soil, although the importation of 
unauthorized foreign reprints into the UK was prohibited except for personal use.72 The 
Board  of  Trade,  and  Gladstone   in  particular   as   its  President  during  Peel’s   second  ministry,  
struggled considerably with the problem of unauthorised foreign reprints entering the UK.73  
An 1838 International Copyright Act, as amended in 1844 by an Act introduced by 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1 ECONOMICA 167, 186 (1934). Historians of the book,  however, 
demonstrate that the circulating library had arisen during the Restoration and expanded substantially in the 
eighteenth   century,   although   certainly   once  Mudie’s   and   the   other   circulating   libraries   had   established   their  
business model they were opposed to changes in the law that might negatively affect it. FEATHER, supra note 40, 
at 153–54. 
70 RCC Minutes 204. 
71 CATHERINE SEVILLE, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF COPYRIGHT LAW: BOOKS, BUCCANEERS AND THE 
BLACK FLAG IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 2 (2009). 
72 JOHN FEATHER, PUBLISHING, PIRACY AND POLITICS: AN HISTORICAL STUDY OF COPYRIGHT IN BRITAIN 150, 
152 (1994); SEVILLE, supra note 71, at 42.  
73 SIMON NOWELL-SMITH, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE PUBLISHER IN THE REIGN OF QUEEN 
VICTORIA 24–33 (1968); SEVILLE, supra note 71, at 43.  
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Gladstone, empowered the monarch to direct that creators of works first published abroad 
would have copyright in Britain and that authors of dramatic pieces and musical 
compositions, first publicly represented and performed abroad, would have the sole liberty of 
representing or performing them in Britain; it also provided for the registry and delivery of 
copies of the books and works and protected them from piracy by importation.74 By the early 
1850s, Britain had bilateral copyright treaties with a dozen countries.75  
Reprinting of British books also began to increase significantly in the United States of 
America, which did not allow foreign authors to obtain copyright protection within its 
borders until the end of the century.76 As in Europe, some American publishers, such as 
Harper & Brothers, attempted to negotiate with and compensate the British authors and/or 
copyright owners, but such arrangements were courtesies of the trade and in no way required 
by the law.77 Large populations of literate English readers dwelt in the United States of 
America so it constituted an enormous market for works of British literature.78 International 
copyright was consequently a prize sought after by many British authors and publishers. With 
the support of a number of prominent British authors, attempts were made to petition the 
United States government to provide copyright protection to foreigners, but these failed.79 In 
1842, Charles Dickens famously travelled to the United States and lobbied heavily for 
recognition of foreign copyrights, but his efforts were unsuccessful and offended many 
members of the publishing trade.80 In 1853, a treaty was signed but not ratified by the U.S. 
Senate.81 
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75 CHARLES PALMER PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT IN WORKS OF LITERATURE AND ART 261 (1863).  
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 Free trade doctrine informed discussions on international copyright and the book trade 
as it did to other trade-related imbalances.82 Following the formation of a reciprocal copyright 
treaty with Prussia in 1846, the Daily News explained,  “this is really only an offshoot from 
the great controversy between Free Trade and Protection. It must be decided by the same 
principles.”83 The paper went further, rejoicing in the future internationalisation of copyright 
that  it  expected  to  follow.  “If the Free-trade policy be half as prosperous as we anticipate, the 
modicum of revenue derived from obstructing transit of works of literature and art may soon 
be dispensed with. Mental productions need then no longer be an exception to the general 
principles of our policy.”84 
 
 Yet attempts to place international copyright within the doctrine of free trade could be 
attacked not only on grounds of principle by protectionists, but also of inapplicability. 
Addressing a meeting of parties interested in international copyright, the author and copyright 
activist Sir Edward Bulwer   Lytton   exhorted   the   audience   “not to mix up with it either the 
consideration of free trade or protection” but to allow the needs of literature to remain aloof 
from party political issues.85  “The politico-economic branch of the subject [of copyright] has 
little to do with theory of Free-trade or Protection. It is rather a question of expediency. The 
interests of literature and the public are, to a great extent identical,” wrote the Liverpool 
Mercury.86  
 If a free trade supporter started from a position of believing that authors ought to have 
some property rights in their works, the further application of free trade doctrine would 
logically lead to the conclusion that such rights should be acknowledged and protected across 
                                                          
82 SEVILLE, supra note 71, at 10  (‘the  relative  merits  of  free  trade  and  protectionism  were  repeatedly  discussed,  
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borders. In a talk before the Association for the Promotion of Social Science, novelist and 
future Copyright Commission member Anthony Trollope recognised that some learned men 
rejected copyright altogether, but he argued that if one accepted copyright law, then one 
could not logically reject its internationalisation. Indeed, he argued that many American 
authors and publishers did not reject the prospect of international copyright. He described the 
situation thus:  
I have never met an American publisher who has not professed himself to be in 
favour of international copyright; but I have met American legislators of both 
houses who have shaken their heads when I have ventured to suggest that the 
mutual interests of the two countries demand reciprocal justice.  It was their duty, 
they thought, to protect the American reader.  If there be one great political lesson 
to be preached, the wide world over, it is that lesson which would teach us to 
abandon the task of protecting anyone, when protection means injustice.87 
 
 United States copyright law had always been intentionally protectionist in its design 
and aims, as was the U.S. economic policy more broadly in the later nineteenth century.88 But 
even if expressed in terms of free trade doctrine, the United States had a defence to their 
protectionist position on copyright, itself grounded in political economy--they were a 
developing nation and simply could not yet afford to recognise foreign copyrights. A defence 
to  temporary  protectionist  measures  could  be  found  in  Mill’s  oft-cited exception to his own 
sense of free trade--that   of   “a young and rising nation, in hopes of naturalising a foreign 
industry, in itself perfectly suitable to the  circumstances  of  the  country.”89 For Mill saw the 
“superiority of one country over another in a branch of production often arises only from 
having begun it sooner. There may be no inherent advantage on one part or disadvantage on 
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the other, but only a present superiority of acquired  skill  and  experience.”90 This passage was 
“‘more frequently quoted in the United States and the British colonies than any which has 
ever  been  written’--at least in books of political  economy.”91  
 While most believed that the size of the market in English books if copyright 
protection extended across the British Empire and the United States would result in lower 
book prices, not everyone agreed.92 One concern was that if British copyrights were 
recognized, American booksellers would be forced to sell the expensive English triple-
deckers.93 While some American publishers were content with protectionist copyright 
policies, others saw it in the interest of business or justice to achieve a reciprocal copyright 
with Britain.94 American publisher George Palmer Putnam and, later, his son and successor 
George Haven Putnam were vocal advocates for international copyright.95 Moreover, some 
argued that the body of American literature itself suffered; the lack of protection for foreign 
works and the popularity of British works in particular, led to the publication of fewer 
American writers, whose works were more expensive due to the protections of copyright 
law.96 American readers were being inundated with British books instead of American books 
with a possible detrimental effect on the development of a national character and literature.97  
 The problems of international copyright also included the question of when and how 
foreigners might obtain copyright protection in the UK themselves. In the 1777 case Bach v 
Longman, the composer Johann Christian Bach had brought an action against the publisher 
Longman claiming a royal privilege, common law right, and statutory rights under the Statute 
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of Anne. As a foreigner first publishing in the UK, Bach obtained the statutory protection.98 
In the 1854 decision of Jefferys v Boosey, however, the Lords determined that the English 
assignee of a work of a foreign composer first published outside of the UK could not receive 
protection under the Statute of Anne.99 The seemingly arbitrary and protectionist effects of 
this decision caused popular outcry. 
 The colonies also posed a significant challenge to the application and effectiveness of 
UK copyright law--particularly in Canada, due to its proximity to the United States of 
America.100 Attempts to prevent reprinting British books or the import of American reprints 
were met with opposition from colonials who protested that they could not afford the high 
price of British books.101 While lacking the independence of the United States, Canada had 
the same problems of high demand and an inability to afford British prices.102 Unlike Britain, 
Canada had a widely-distributed population and lacked a well-stocked network of circulating 
libraries. In the wake of complaints from the colonies, and with the support of Gladstone, as 
Colonial Secretary, and the Board of Trade, the Government passed legislation that would 
allow each colony to deal with its own situation.103 The 1847 Foreign Reprints Act allowed 
“foreign reprints” to be imported into a colony where the colony passed local legislation 
providing for the protection of British authors.104 Canada passed legislation to this effect, 
which allowed Canadian readers access to unauthorised American reprints of British books, 
which were naturally much cheaper than the imports from Britain. In essence, the Foreign 
Reprints Act of 1847 legalised what was already an existing practice of importing cheap 
American copies of British works into Canada. Very few duties were collected, and in terms 
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of securing any remuneration for UK authors, it was a failure.105 This unsatisfactory situation 
was  one  of  the  factors  that  led  to  the  Board  of  Trade’s  search  for  an  alternative  to  copyright  
and expensive English editions in the colonies.  
 
Report and Dissent 
Like the eighteenth-century copyright controversies,106 the Copyright Commission report has 
been used  in  scholarship  attempting  to  “de-naturalise” the history of copyright law in works 
such   as   Lionel   Bentley   and   Brad   Sherman’s   The Making of Modern Intellectual Property 
Law,107 and  Ronan  Deazley’s  Rethinking Copyright.108 The former does not recognize the 
significant dissent on the Commission and treats the Report as the product of an essentially 
unified   body,   as   did   earlier  works,   for   example  Augustine   Birrell’s   Seven Lectures on the 
Law and History of Copyright.109 Recent works by Deazley and Paul K. Saint-Amour, 
however, use the Royal Commission on Copyright to demonstrate that the underlying 
justifications of copyright law were subject to significant controversy and that alternatives 
were seriously considered, drawing on its debates and dissent to contradict the view that 
strong copyright is an essential and inevitable facet of Anglo-American law.110 Discussions 
of the Commission by Alexander, Deazley, Saint-Amour, and Seville have all identified the 
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relevance of free trade doctrine to an understanding of the Commission’s   findings.111 This 
intention of this article, however, is to focus on the influence and contradictions of free trade 
doctrine in greater depth than the previous works.  
 The  Commission’s  majority  Report, published in 1878, determined that copyright 
was indeed a property right, albeit a limited one.112 Based on their understanding of the 
current law, and grounded in the legal history, they expressed: 
no doubt that the interest of authors and of the public alike requires that some 
specific protection should be afforded by legislation to owners of copyright; and 
we have arrived at the conclusion that copyright should continue to be treated by 
law as a proprietary right, and that it is not expedient to substitute a right to a 
royalty defined by statute, or any other right of a similar kind.113 
 Accessibility to affordable English literature in the colonies was necessarily a matter 
of importance to the Commission.114  The problem posed by the importation of cheap 
American copies of English works into Canada was a delicate one.115 While avoiding 
interference with the Canadian Copyright Act of 1875, the Commission made two 
recommendations: the introduction of a licensing system in the colonies and the continuation 
of the Foreign Reprints Act with some alterations.116  It suggested several formalities to 
identify copies of foreign reprints and urged repeal of a provision that allowed for the 
introduction of colonial reprints back into the United Kingdom. It also opposed re-
registration of colonial works in England and submission of such works to the British 
Museum as prerequisites for copyright in the United Kingdom. Thus, the Commission 
recommendations appeased the colonial interests to a degree but at the expense of 
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maintaining a fragmented market in English language books within the Empire.117 It was, 
perhaps, not theoretically consistent with the propertarian view of copyright, in that it 
severely limited the control of the copyright owner over his property in the colonies in a way 
that was deemed inappropriate domestically. However, it did not go as far as the colonies had 
hoped in providing access to inexpensive literature, and there was some dissent.118  
 The Report intentionally limited its analysis of the merits of copyright as a property 
right versus a royalty system to a brief discussion, providing an outline of the most important 
arguments for and against the royalty system.119 This omission of a lengthy justification for 
copyright based in property theory is very likely because even the Commissioners who 
broadly accepted a proprietary copyright regime would not have come to an agreement on a 
cohesive theory of property and its application to copyright law.120 Instead, the Report took a 
pragmatic approach, keeping the structure of copyright law intact, but recommending 
changes where the Commission had identified a need. In order to appreciate the level of 
controversy over the foundational principles of the law, one needs to look to the Minutes, 
Mallet’s  dissent, or later essays by Froude, T.H, Farrer, and Matthew Arnold.121  
As noted above, Mallet dissented from the conclusions of the Commission as well as 
the implicit justifications for a proprietary copyright regime.  In it, he set forth “the abstract 
principles” which he believed formed the foundation for the copyright system.122 He believed 
that copyright had arisen as a practical measure in order to deal with a technological 
development—the market failure resulting from the invention of the printing press—and he 
thought it absurd for authors to be benefiting from this technological innovation to which 
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they had not contributed.123 He suggested that the protection   of   an   author’s   particular  
expression could be protected by contract law, if indeed it needed protecting at all.124 For in 
Mallet’s  view it was the ideas contained within the work that were the most valuable part of 
the work, and not the form of the expression. 
Mallet’s   central   argument dismissing the notion of natural property rights in 
creative works is a familiar one: unlike tangible property, creative works can be copied 
and retain their value. They lack scarcity, and so are distinct from other forms of tangible 
property, therefore, the law should not treat them as analogous. During the Commission 
hearings, some witnesses had argued that authors possess a complete property interest, 
which would require the law to acknowledge a perpetual right. Mallet wholly rejected this 
extreme position. Artificial limitation of supply was necessary for the very existence of 
copyright. Indefinite numbers of copies can be made, so scarcity and monopoly rights are 
created artificially by law in order to give the works value.125 As we have seen, the use of 
the  word  “monopoly”  by a hard-line free trader was itself damning.   
Once he had dispatched the natural rights position, Mallet considered whether 
copyright might be reasonably justified on any other basis.126  In his view, the only relevant 
consideration was whether legal interference was necessary to obtain the best and cheapest 
literature for the public good.127 The evidence set before the Commission did not persuade 
him; he believed a government-administered royalty system would be more effective at 
achieving a market in cheap books. Nevertheless, he conceded that moving suddenly from a 
copyright system to a royalty system would be too sudden a change.128 Based on the 
principles he had articulated, Mallet went on to examine critically the Report’s  
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recommendations in the areas of Home, Colonial, and International Copyright.129 He was not 
a lone voice, and had support from members Drummond Wolff, John Rose and Edward 
Jenkins with regard to his position on the duration of the copyright term.130    
Mallet’s  own brand of Cobdenite free trade doctrine was influenced by neoclassical 
economic thought, particularly with regard to the theories of value propounded by Jevons and 
Bastiat. While Mallet asserted “the first great law of humanity is labour,”131 he rejected the 
labour theory of value favoured by many political economists, such as Ricardo and Mill, and 
instead advocated a theory of value based on the demand of the consumer.132 It is consumer 
demand that creates  value,  and  therefore,  when  framing  legislation  or  “social  arrangements”  
it is only the consumer that should be considered.133 “The  interest  of  the  producer  is  always  
opposed to that of society; that of the consumer is always identical with the interests of 
society,”   wrote   Mallet.134 According to his straightforward theory, the interests of the 
community could only mean that books should be as cheap and plentiful as possible, and he 
recognized no other factors as contributing to the analysis.   
According to Mallet’s   political economic thought, there were only two possible 
methods  for  maintaining  the  equilibrium  of  supply  and  demand,  the  first  being  “the  institution  
of private property and free exchange applied to all  values,”  and the second being  “collective 
property and regulated exchange.” 135  He was as strongly in favour of the former as he was 
opposed  to  the  latter:  “[t]he  first  rests  on  the  principle  of  personal  freedom;;  the  second  on  that  
of  constraint.”136  In his view, the experiences of human history and human nature “make  it  
clear that the one thing needful in the interest of labour is the greatest possible increase of 
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capital. If this is once admitted, all the socialistic schemes with which we are afflicted must 
suffer an ignominious  collapse.’137 He feared the spectre of communist thought: 
It is because I believe that the work of Governments lies in providing for the full 
and undisturbed action of the forces of freedom, instead of interfering themselves 
with their operation; and that our social disorders can only be remedied by 
pressing along the lines of progress, laid for us by Cobden and the League; that I 
view with pain and fear the morbid craving of our time after other agencies, in 
most of which may be detected, disguise it as we may, the germ of Communism, 
a fatal poison, tainting at their common source two of the most sacred springs of 
social life, personal liberty and personal responsibility.138 
 
Thus, Mallet had to set copyright law on one of the poles of possible forms of government—
pure capitalism or pure collectivism. Copyright did not fit well into either framework. He 
believed it was in the greatest public good to provide as many cheap books as possible; he 
thought a limited government-regulated royalty system would be allow for freer competition 
than a copyright regime and achieve this goal of lowering book prices. Scrutton had 
identified a certain “‘communistic’  character  of  the  Law  of  Copyright,”  built into the system 
via the limitations of the right; copyright involved the reversion of individual property to the 
public after the expiration of a period of time.139 Following   Scrutton’s   logic,   Mallet’s  
suggestion that the right should be limited even further in order to promote the public 
availability of cheap books—to promote the public good—is  even  more  “communistic”  than  
the existing regime. Yet, as demonstrated above, Mallet reviled communism and any 
tendency towards socialist thought was contrary to his free trade orthodoxy.  For example, he 
described  the  socialistic  elements  that  had  crept  into  Mill’s  later  economic  thought as having 
“brought  into  an  unnatural  and  sinister  alliance  the  teachings  of  the  English  universities,  and  
of   Proudhon   and   Karl   Marx.”140 This seeming contradiction between Mallet   and   Farrer’s  
distrust of socialism and their support of a royalty system did not go unnoticed.  
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The Royalty Proposal  
The case for mandatory royalties applicable in the colonies was made by representatives from 
the Board of Trade, namely civil servant Charles Trevelyan and Farrer, both of whom were 
solid free traders.141 The system would allow authors to receive some remuneration for works 
reprinted by colonial publishers, but it would be regulated by Government and remove a great 
degree of the author’s  control  over  a  work--it was a Government-controlled privilege clearly 
inconsistent with a propertarian view of copyright, in which the bulk of the rights rested with 
the author/owner. If one believed that the creation was the property of the creator and that 
copyright effectively limited and facilitated what would otherwise be a perpetual right in the 
public interest, the idea of removing the element of proprietary control was a step too far.  
 Farrer also advocated allowing the importation of these colonial reprints, which would 
compete with domestic publishing. When pressed, Farrer had suggested that ideally the 
royalty system would be extended beyond the colonies; he thought it would be preferable to 
the existing law of copyright in Britain in terms of cheapening books, but felt that it would be 
too radical a change to implement immediately.  
 Farrer, later Baron Farrer, was an uncompromising free trader and a long-serving civil 
servant. He had a short-lived career as a barrister, but went on to have a profound influence 
on the reform and development of British commercial law during more than thirty years at 
the Board of Trade.142 He   had   long   been   the   Board   of   Trade’s   copyright   expert   and   was  
appointed to the first Commission, but declined the appointment to the second Commission 
due to work commitments. Nevertheless, he was to make a substantial contribution to the 
Commission, appearing eight times as a witness. The extent to which Mallet and Farrer were 
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allied cannot be overemphasised. They had worked together in the Board of Trade for several 
years, when Mallet was serving as Private Secretary to the President. The two men were close 
friends and very frequent correspondents; they had spent decades thrashing out issues of 
political economy together and their views were closely aligned.143 In one letter to Mallet, 
Farrer reminded him, “[a]lways   capitalize   ‘Free  Trade’.”144 Mallet’s  dissenting   report  drew 
heavily from a paper by Farrer.145 The paper, which addressed directly some of the arguments 
for strong copyright presented before the Commission, was eventually published in the 
Fortnightly after the Report was published.146   
Farrer clearly disapproved of giving  authors  and  publishers  a  “monopoly right,” but 
he felt authors ought to receive some remuneration, and he limited his advocacy of the 
royalty proposal to the colonies.147 When questioned by Fitzjames Stephen on this point, he 
regarded  “some description of monopoly” as being the only way by which an English author 
could be remunerated without the kind of radical reforms to the domestic legal framework 
that he deemed impracticable, at least for the moment.148 His aims were simply to cheapen all 
books  and  expand  authors’ markets.  Farrer  did  not  share  some  of  the  commission  members’  
and  witnesses’   concerns   about   the  nature   and  quality  of   the  books   in  question,   saying   “we 
must trust to the public  demand  purifying  itself.”149  
Mallet led his friend through his testimony on the 13th of March, developing his own 
arguments  on   the  economic   rationale   for   limited  privileges   through   the  medium  of  Farrer’s  
obedient agreement and exegesis. They agreed that the expediency of all law should be 
assessed with reference to “the general interests of the community, rather than with reference 
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to supposed abstract rights of property on the part of the authors.”150  They believed copyright 
was different from corporeal property  by  virtue  of  being  a  “right to prevent other people from 
reproducing” in order to encourage and reward literature for the benefit of the public.151  
Farrer also agreed  with  Mallet   that   author’s   limited  monopoly   led   to   a   similar   commercial  
monopoly on the part of the publisher; the result of  which  Mallet   identified   as   “a distinct 
violation of those principles of free trade which have been adopted formally by the 
Legislature.”152 The royalty proposal was “the only plan” by means of which a benefit for 
authors would   be   retained   but   the  monopoly   “restricted, so as to do justice to the public” 
Farrer said.153 
“The general principle of your evidence seems to go on this, that copyright is a 
monopoly,” Froude asked. “It is desirable, you say, to have cheap books. But it is desirable to 
have cheap bread, and cheap meat, and cheap clothes, and many other things, but the Board 
of Trade would not be prepared to legislate to make  things  of  that  kind  cheap?”154 
Farrer, of course, denied any desire on the part of the civil service to regulate the price 
of any of those items. Copyright could be distinguished from these other products as a form 
of property created by the Legislature, he explained. 
“But all property is created by law, is it not?” queried Froude.155 
Farrer agreed, but, in his view, once an author released a work into the public, then it 
was “given to the world” and might be reproduced by anyone, except as the law chooses to 
limit the freedom of people to do so.156 When pressed by Froude, he distinguished it from 
other forms of property--“absolute  property”--with an argument of some circularity: unlike 
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other kinds of property, copyright has been limited by the Legislature and therefore, it may be 
limited by the Legislature.157  
At one hearing, the noted lexicographer and Commission member Dr William Smith 
also attacked Farrer’s  persistent description of copyright as monopoly, noting  that  the  word’s  
use in English law  was   restricted   to   situations   “where there was a royal grant authorising 
some one or more persons only to deal in or sell a certain commodity or article.”158 Farrer 
explained that historically both patents and copyrights were, in fact, monopolies in the strict 
legal sense of Smith’s  definition;;  in  terms  of  their  own  time, he  cited  Macaulay’s  own  use  of  
the word in the context of copyright, suggesting it was  commonly  used  to  mean  “an  exclusive  
power  of  sale.”159 Smith persisted in attacking the monopoly descriptor. If, when determining 
whether a monopoly existed, one defined the relevant market as the market in a single, 
specific book, then one could assert that copyright created monopolies. If, however, one 
considered the relevant market as the market in all competing books of a given description on 
a given subject, then one could not say a monopoly existed. Smith probed the issue with 
rapid-fire questions: 
But is not an author exposed to unrestricted competition? Directly he publishes a 
work on a particular subject, may not another immediately publish another book 
on the same subject? Is it not the fact that directly one publisher brings out a book 
which proves successful, another publisher endeavours to bring out another and 
better book on the same subject and at a lower price?  Do not therefore author and 
publisher work under the stimulus of open and free competition? Would it not 
therefore be more correct to say that there is free trade in the production and sale 
of books rather than monopoly?160 
 
Farrer’s  simple  response  was  that  “in one sense there is free trade; another book may 
be written on the same subject, but the same  book  may  not  be  reproduced.”161 
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The next  thread  of  Smith’s  questioning  related  to  the  nature  of  the  property.  He  cited  
Lord  Mansfield’s   definition   of   “an incorporeal right to the sole printing and publishing of 
something intellectual communicated by letters.”162  Farrer agreed that literary compositions 
in their original state, before they had left the mind or desk of an author, were protected, but 
he distinguished this kind of property from the possibility of post-publication right, the source 
of all the controversy.  Smith posed the argument that unless one allowed for the publication 
of a literary composition, the  property  was  useless,  and  “property without the power of use or 
disposal  is  not  property.”163 Farrer disagreed, saying that one could certainly possess property 
that is not a source of profit, and whether a further privilege was attached to the property as a 
means of making it profitable was itself a fair question for debate.164 Smith, like Froude in a 
previous meeting, was unable to escape analogising with physical property, comparing 
protection from theft of physical property to protection from copying of incorporeal property. 
In response, Farrer correctly distinguished between property in the physical object versus the 
intellectual property in the work--a distinction which he did not always make consistently. 
The book or the machine which you make are reserved by law to the exclusive 
use of you and yours precisely in the same way and to the same extent as the 
house, or the piece of cotton goods, or the pair of scissors. If anyone takes them 
from you, you can recover them at law and shut up the thief in gaol. But what you 
claim under the name of copyright and patent right is a very different thing. It is a 
right to prevent other people from imitating your book, or your machine. This is a 
right which does not exist in the case of the house or the piece of cotton goods, or 
the pair of scissors. It is a right of a totally different and exceptional character and 
rests on its own special grounds of utility.165 
 
Dr Smith quickly changed tactics, but he continued to build on this idea of the essential 
difference between books and other commodities.   
 Shortly  following  Farrer’s  explanation  of  the  nature  of  copyright  as  distinct  from  the  
property right in the physical object, Smith began to use the distinction to question the 
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accuracy  of  Farrer’s  empirical  predictions  as   to   the  effects  of  a   royalty  system  on   the  book  
market. While, as a general economic principle, reduction of price in an article would lead to 
greater consumption, in the case of books that required significant mental effort for their 
production, Farrer had   to   admit   that   the   market   for   “the very highest class of mental 
productions...is, and always must be, a comparatively limited one,” though he thought the 
normal rules of supply and demand would still apply to a great many books.166 Smith 
attacked   Farrer   and   Mallet’s   belief   that   seeking   small   profits   and   quick   returns   was   a  
desirable goal in the case of the book trade; the royalty proposal would encourage such small 
profits and quick returns.  Publishers,  suggested  Smith,  “would refuse to publish all books not 
likely to pay by a large   and   immediate  circulation.”167  Farrer protested that neither he nor 
Mallet   “intended to apply the principle of small profits and quick returns to a case where 
there was no demand,  or  a  very  limited  demand,” but he did not satisfactorily explain how the 
incentive structure of the royalty system could function differently with regard to that specific 
situation. Smith went on to emphasize the effects of uncertainty in the market as the primary 
contributing factor to the high price of books.168   
 Robert Andrew Macfie, a free-trade hardliner and strident intellectual property 
critic,169 was also called as a witness before the Commission. Macfie was the sugar-refiner 
son of a sugar-refiner who became a very active Member of Parliament between 1868 and 
1874.170 He was sceptical of patents and copyright and had served a member of the House of 
Commons Select Committee appointed to inquire into the workings of the patent system in 
1871.171 The extremity of his views varied--sometimes he argued that copyright was 
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defensible, though patent was not,172 or that the laws should be reformed rather than 
abolished outright--but his opinions on the subject were always rooted in a concerned distaste 
for intellectual property.173   
 Macfie’s  own  royalty  proposal  was  of  broader  applicability  than  that  of  Farrer  and  the  
Board of Trade; he submitted a briefing to the Commission, enclosed within a book on the 
law of copyright, which became Appendix A in its published minutes.  He recommended that 
an automatic five percent royalty on the retail price of books sold to go to the author, as a 
compromise between the current system of copyright and outright abolition.174  Questioned 
by Lord Manners, he explained: 
It  is  possible  that  one  might  convince  one’s  self  by  argument,  that  on  the  whole  
the interests of the public would be promoted by abolishing copyright; that, I 
believe,  was  Mr.  Cobden’s  opinion;;  he  told  me  that  he  was  against  copyright;;  but  
I cannot say that is the opinion which I at this moment entertain.  I believe, 
however, that the abolition of the monopoly principle in copyright and the 
substitution of a royalty, that is to say, liberty to republish, accompanied with a 
remuneration to the authors, in proportion to the number of copies printed for 
sale,–would be advantageous.175 
 
Macfie believed that his proposed royalty system would encourage competition between 
publishers, which would increase the sale of the books. If free trade in books could be 
achieved,   and   “the sale of books increased fifty-fold,” he also foresaw tremendous social 
benefits,  “education would practically be very greatly developed; philanthropists, teetotallers, 
and others would be delighted by having a wholesome employment and entertainment for the 
people  in  their  evenings.”176 
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Commission members pointed out that there was not a monopoly in books to the 
extent that authors were free to write and publishers were free to publish books on any 
subject they wished. But Macfie suggested that the current book trade, where one publisher 
entered into an agreement with an author to publish one book to the exclusion of other 
publishers, was analogous to potters  saying  to  each  other  “‘I will go in for cups and saucers, 
you will go in for dinner plates, and a third will go in for bedroom pottery’ and not allowing 
the potters to manufacture the specialty of another.”177 Fundamentally, the dispute over 
copyright as a monopoly centred on what constituted the relevant market over which the 
rights-holder had exclusive control and what was the relevant subject of sale. Some viewed 
the relevant market as the market for books of a certain description or on a particular subject. 
For Macfie, the relevant market was the market for an individual book and the relevant 
question was whether there were restraints on the trade in books as commodities themselves--
not as abstract works. 
Macfie did not believe that authors had any positive right to remuneration for their 
labour at all, let alone a natural property right arising from that labour. Even with regard to 
his royalty proposal, he presented the compensation it provided to authors as being desirable 
simply  “as a matter of expediency and fair play.”178  When questioned about the justification 
for copyright law by Trollope indirectly, and by Jenkins directly, Macfie asserted that its only 
purpose was to incentivise  publishers  to  publish,  as  “the law contemplates that men write for 
the good of their species, and for the gratification   of   their   desires.”179 The current system 
went against the purpose, as he saw it, because by making copyright property it prevented 
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competition. By preventing competition, it prevented the public from access to books while 
they  were  still  “fresh”.180  
 
Free Trade in Support of Copyright 
For several months of meetings, it seemed as though the only serious criticisms of the royalty 
proposal from other witnesses were that it would do harm to authors and shake up the market-
-arguments that were vague and difficult to prove. Some objections seemed to rely on a belief 
in the natural rights of authors to the fruits of their labours, but these arguments were not 
presented in a well-developed or sophisticated manner. It was not until the testimony of 
philosopher and social critic Herbert Spencer that the royalty proposal was attacked using the 
very arsenal of its proponents: principles of political economy and free trade doctrine. 
Herbert Spencer, like Macfie and Farrer, was a free trade advocate and member of the 
Cobden Club, but, unlike them, he believed that copyright was a form of property and should 
receive legal treatment befitting its status as such.   
That  a  man’s  right  to  the  produce of his brain is equally valid with his right to the 
produce of his hands, is a fact which has yet obtained but a very imperfect 
recognition.  It is true that we have patent laws, a law of copyright, and acts for 
the registration of designs; but these, or at any rate two of them, have been 
enacted not so much in obedience to the dictates of justice, as in deference to the 
suggestions of trade policy.181 
 
In his first published work, Social Statics, Spencer  addressed  the  question  of  “The  Right  of  
Property in Ideas,” which along with his other subjects of inquiry, he continued to develop 
until the final edition of Social Statics, abridged and revised, in 1892.182 Spencer equated the 
labour of the mind with other forms of labour, and intellectual property with personal 
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property.183 He explained that uncertainty of legal recognition of rights took away the 
incentive to creation and encouraged secrecy in creators.  Lack of certainty with regard to the 
fate of a creative work released into the world could discourage dissemination.  “In  this,  as  in  
other  cases”, he argued,  “disobedience to the moral law is ultimately detrimental to all.”184 
He acknowledged that there was a necessary qualification in the rights, due to the possibility 
that minds may have the same ideas almost simultaneously, and this qualification had been 
expressed with limited terms, although he was unable to say how the correct term would be 
determined.185 
Moreover, Spencer’s writing suggested sympathy for moral rights in creative works as 
well as economic rights--his own personal experience led him to the understanding that an 
author might wish to maintain a degree of control over his work after publication. As Spencer 
developed and redacted ideas during his lifetime, he attempted to prevent earlier editions with 
less-mature expositions of these ideas from being circulated. Before his death in 1903, he 
wrote about his great fear that someone might publish, seven years after his death, versions of 
his works in which copyright had expired, in which he had expressed views that he had 
relinquished or amended in later works.186  In order to demonstrate that this was not being 
done to him, an inexpensive 1910 copyright edition of his work includes a prefatory note 
explaining that the Herbert Spencer Trustees arranged for this edition to reflect only the 
author’s  final  opinions.187 
Spencer appeared as a witness before the Royal Commission on Copyright twice: on 6 
and 20 March 1877.188 At the first meeting, his contribution largely consisted of an 
explanation of his prior experience with publication and an expression of his view that a 
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royalty  system  would  prejudice  “books of the graver class”--heavy academic tomes requiring 
much labour but being unlikely to produce much in the way of royalties.189 His testimony on 
this occasion was largely grounded in personal experience; he was sure that work with great 
academic value but a small market would be extremely unattractive to publishers under a 
system of royalties, where they would have little control over setting the price for such books.   
 Spencer balked at Farrer’s   goal   to   secure   for   books   “the cheapest possible price 
consistent with a fair profit to those concerned” as reminiscent of the old-style arguments in 
favour of protectionism.190 He rejected the monopoly descriptor and directly attacked the 
royalty proposals as being contrary to the doctrine of fair trade.  
I find it stated in the evidence lately given that there has not been raised ‘an  
insuperable  objection   in  point  of  principle’   to   the  plan  of  a   royalty.      If  no  such  
objection in point of principle has been raised, I think one may be raised: the 
objection, namely, that it is distinctly opposed to the principles of free trade.191   
 
He went on to describe the practical problems embedded in the terms of the royalty proposal. 
It would require the government to determine the prices of books. In odd contrast to the free 
trade expectation that the government would avoid interference with the marketplace, the 
government would instead be closely managing the trade. 
 Sir  Henry  Holland  interjected,  “you will hardly contend that the system of royalty is 
less in accord with free trade than the existing system of monopoly; you will not carry it so 
far  as  that,  will  you?”192   
Spencer still refused   to   acknowledge   that   the   term   “monopoly”   was   applicable.  
“There are people who call the capitalist a monopolist....I do not think he is rightly so called.”  
He too construed the relevant market in literary works in broader terms than an individual 
book--he saw free competition between different  books  on  the  same  subject.  “I   regard  both  
the   term   ‘free trade’ as applied to the unrestrained issue of rival editions, and the term 
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‘monopoly’ as  applied  to  the  author’s  copyright, as question-begging  terms,” he explained.193 
The royalty proposal, requiring extensive government regulation of compensation and pricing 
as it did, was at odds with principles of political economy as he understood them. Either the 
royalty system would change or would not change the financial returns of the producers of 
books; Spencer expected it would change the returns at the expense of the publisher.  In his 
view, there was no evidence that publishing differed from any other business in its return on 
capital,   and   artificially   lowering   publishers’   returns   through   government regulation would 
simply   “drive away a certain amount of capital out of the publishing business into more 
remunerative businesses.”194 Competition would then decrease, profits in those businesses 
remaining would rise, and eventually the price of books would return to where it had been. 
He pointed   out   that   there   was   already   a   “natural cheapening of books” in the publishing 
industry: where there was demand, publishers issued cheap editions themselves that, in a 
sense, competed with their more expensive editions. In response, Holland argued that there 
was a long delay in the production of cheaper editions by an original publisher; poorer 
persons still would not be unlikely to purchase an edition nor access a book through a 
circulating library, whereas under the royalty system a cheap edition might be released 
immediately.195  Spencer was appalled by this line of reasoning: 
Then I take it that the proposal really amounts to this, that whereas, at present, the 
poorer class of readers are inconvenienced by having to wait for a cheap edition a 
certain number of years, they shall, by this arrangement, be advantaged by having 
a cheap edition forthwith; which is to say that people with smaller amounts of 
money shall have no disadvantage from their smaller amounts of money. It is 
communistic practically: it is simply equalising the advantages of wealth and 
poverty.196 
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The   royalty   system,   in   Spencer’s   opinion, would not even achieve its aim of cheapening 
books in the short term; the rapid competition would result in an excess of supply, which 
would lead to waste copies and no reduction in prices. The only way to cheapen books, he 
argued, was the extension of the market that would result from recognition of copyright 
internationally.  As to how to effect such international copyright recognition, even Spencer 
could not begin to say.197 
Farrer responded to Spencer’s   factual  assertions   in  some  detail--he must have either 
attended  the  session  of  6  March  or  read  a  transcript.    He  contested  Spencer’s  assertion  that  he  
would be harmed by the royalty system due to the costs of production and limited market.  In 
Spencer’s  unusual  position,  he  explained,  a  second publisher would not be able to afford to 
step in and compete with the first, expensive and limited edition of the book, and so the 
royalty system would not lead the initial publishers to bear a loss.198   
 Later, in a footnote to an article on copyright in the Fortnightly, Farrer observed:  
It is a remarkable illustration of the effect of a theory on a powerful intellect that 
Mr. Herbert Spencer regards any attempt to qualify the absolute monopoly of the 
copyright owner as an interference, not only with the rights of property, but with 
the doctrines of Free Trade. So completely has the right of the author filled his 
mind, that he seems to have forgotten that in order to have the full benefit of 
freedom of trade there must be freedom in production as well as in consumption, 
of supply as well as of demand.199  
 
This passage emphasizes  Farrer’s  idea  of  freedom  of  production  as  a  question  of  the  books  
themselves--though he had previously pointed out the distinction, here he appears to 
conflate the copyright work with the physical commodity when he speaks in terms of 
“production.” Freedom of production to Farrer meant freedom to publish any existing 
book that one chose to publish, not the freedom to write a new book on any subject that 
one might choose to write. Spencer, Froude, Trollope, and Smith would have viewed 
freedom of production as the latter when applied to literature. 
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 Thus, we see that one of the difficulties in applying free trade principles to copyright 
was the question of the relationship of literary works to trade and commerce. Some, like 
Farrer, identified books as commercial objects to be traded like any others, while others, like 
Spencer, were more concerned with the copyright work as an intangible. Property theory was 
relevant   as  well,   but   not  determinative.     Farrer   and  Mallet’s  market-driven theory of value 
may have led them to dismiss arguments in favour of copyright based on a labour theory of 
value, however Macfie attacked copyright using tools of labour theory and Fitzjames Stephen  
supported copyright as a limited right due to the difficulties raised by identifying the value of 
creative works until they are placed on the market, at which point they can be copied with 
abandon.200 Though Sherman and Bently have identified the nineteenth century as a period 
when  “the model of copyright law...came to embody the belief that copyright was beyond the 
remit of trade and commerce,” we see from the Commission that this belief was certainly 
challenged.201  
 Further opposition to the royalty proposal from a natural rights perspective came from 
biologist Thomas Henry Huxley. Like Spencer, he took the position that copyright was not 
merely a legislative creation but a natural property right. He   found   it   singular   that   “the 
straitest school of free traders” would produce an argument that maintained books were  
a kind of property to be disposed of mainly for the benefit of the persons who 
read them, and that the State should take upon itself somewhat the same function 
as it used formerly to do when it passed sumptuary laws, and should regulate the 
amount of profit to be derived by the author according to what it considers fair 
and reasonable.202  
 
Huxley’s  argument  suggested  that   if one accepted the argument that public interest was the 
paramount consideration in the disposal of valuable literary works then it did not follow that 
unpublished works should remain the sole property of their authors.  
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If   for  example   I  had  had   the  good  fortune   to  write  such  a  work  as  “Hamlet”...it  
would appear, according to that line of argument, that the State would be justified 
in seizing all the copies of it, and in disposing of them in such a manner as might 
be conducive to their distribution, and that mainly on the ground of the great 
service to the public which those books might render.203 
 
Rather, Huxley thought that an author had an absolute right to property in his creation, and 
like Reade above, he distinguished the property right from the means of protecting that right. 
Huxley argued that State ought to confer copyright as a practical method of protecting that 
property once the author has released it into the world--in sharp contrast to the position that 
the State confers copyright where no rights existed in order to encourage the creation and 
dissemination of works for the benefit of the public. In his view, the function of copyright 
legislation was to overcome the inconvenience that would result from allowing each creator 
to negotiate the protection of such property separately. This  sort  of  property  was  still  “subject 
to the ordinary rules of free trade, namely that a man shall make any contract which he 
pleases with regard to the disposal of his property.”204 
Edward Jenkins was a radical liberal MP and novelist whose views on copyright were 
not clearly aligned with any of the camps on the Commission. He sought to determine the 
extent of the property right envisioned by Huxley--could he distinguish between a book 
conveying ideas and a machine embodying an invention in its form? Huxley fell back on the 
idea/expression dichotomy to settle some of the inherent difficulties in distinguishing 
between  the  two  kinds  of  protection.  “My contention for the protection of property in books 
is entirely with regard to the particular form in which the author chooses to put his ideas.”205  
By restricting protection to the specific expression of the ideas--the form in which they are 
embodied, as he put it--rather than the ideas themselves, the ideas still remained free for 
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widespread use. Huxley argued that,  “as  a  matter  of  strict  right” copyright protection ought to 
be perpetual, but “as a matter of expediency” he did not think it would be worth asking for.206  
 The evidence given by Spencer and Huxley was a great blow to the royalty schemes 
proposed by Farrer and Macfie.  Spencer’s  description  of   the  practical  problems   inherent   in  
the proposal, and his criticism of the government interference with pricing that the royalty 
scheme necessitated, utilized the very arsenal of free trade economics that Farrer and Macfie 
had   employed   in   support   of   royalties.  Huxley’s   unrealized   ideal   of   copyright   legislation   to  
bring about the protection of an absolute, albeit incorporeal, property of an author positively 
contradicted  Farrer’s  depiction  of  copyright  a  necessary  mechanism  enacted  by  legislation  in  
order to benefit the public interest. Clearly some of the Commission members--namely, 
Froude and Smith--were sympathetic to the former position, while Mallet, Holland, and, to 
some degree, Jenkins were inclined towards the latter.  
The Commissioners could not simply be divided into two factions: author-centric 
natural rights theorists versus utilitarian free traders. 207 Jenkins was not alone in rejecting the 
royalty proposal and view copyright as a proprietary right but not as a natural right. The 
Association for the Protection of the Rights of Authors, the membership of which included 
Trollope, Jenkins, and Froude, had explicitly not made the claim that copyright was a natural 
right in 1876, but had nevertheless clearly positioned itself in favour of reform and strong 
copyright protection.208  
Fitzjames Stephen too viewed copyright as the creation of statute.209 He saw no 
reason why once the State had acknowledged a property right, it might not include limitations 
on that right. Ultimately, the robust conservative Fitzjames Stephen, while being politically 
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far from Farrer, had an understanding of the nature of copyright as property, which, in some 
ways, was closer to that of his old enemy than his supposed allies on the Commission.  
 Fitzjames Stephen was  the  author  of  “finest  exposition  of  conservative  thought  in  the  
latter  half  of   the  nineteenth  century,”  Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, his forceful response to 
Mill’s   On Liberty also grounded in utilitarian principles.210 Although he had stood for 
Parliament as a Liberal, Fitzjames Stephen had begun to realize that his fundamental 
conservativism, exhibited by his growing scepticism of the elevation of the principle of 
liberty above all, placed him far away from many members of his party.211 Liberty was a 
central tenet of liberal ideology, but Fitzjames Stephen argued that it is a mistake to view 
liberty as an absolute good.212 In his  view,  Mill’s  assessment  of human nature left peacefully 
to its own devices was far too rosy. Liberty in the abstract is not so precious, he argued. On 
the contrary, compulsion, whether through law or through public opinion, is both necessary 
and desirable in order to prevent the excesses to which people are prone if left 
unrestrained.213  Some degree of coercion, Stephen thought, was necessary to maintain moral 
standards in the individual and the society as a whole. He distrusted democracy. He thought 
that the power of education was vastly over-exaggerated by Mill—there were some elements 
of the public on whom education would have little effect.214 
 Fitzjames Stephen also voiced concerns about the effects of wider distribution of the 
sort of literature that appealed to the masses. In his view, public morality would not be served 
by wider dissemination of novels which, like those of Reade, Dickens or Jenkins, used 
popular sentiment to attack the fundamental institutions of British society, which themselves 
performed essential functions in governing that society. The popular novelists of the day 
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could and might well be read by every literate reader of fiction. Studies of the reading public 
in the Victorian era suggest there was not a great stratification amongst the novel-reading 
public,   “for though...Dickens, Reade, and Wilkie Collins were the idols of the man in the 
street and George Eliot and Trollope of the educated, yet each class read or perfectly well 
might have read the entire output of all   the   contemporary   novelists.”215 In Fitzjames 
Stephen’s   opinion,   by   exaggerating   the   facts   in   the   interest   of   their   political   agendas,  
sentimental novelists failed in their duty to provide proper moral instruction to their readers. 
He was not alone in expressing this sort of concern over the effects of popular literature in the 
nineteenth century.216  
 Due to his concern over their influence and his scepticism with regard to their merit, 
Fitzjames Stephen did not consider the high cost of books, particularly novels, to be a serious 
social problem. Indeed, it is not clear that he viewed the cost of books as excessively high or 
even beyond the reach of the average Englishman.  In an 1857 article, he came close to 
suggesting that too many books--usually the kind of works which people should be 
discouraged from reading--had become too inexpensive. In an article Railroad Bookselling, 
he  wrote,   “twenty years ago, a novel of any kind was an expensive luxury--at the present 
day, it costs only twice   as   much   as   a   pot   of   beer.”217 In his view, cheapening books, 
particularly popular books, would not benefit the public.  
 The object of legislation, Fitzjames Stephen  believed,  is  “to make people better than 
they  would  be  without  compulsion.”218 To cheapen and popularize literature would result in 
greater availability of lower quality books and the suppression of valuable, labour-intensive 
books intended for a limited audience; Spencer had made this argument in terms of the 
                                                          
215 Q.D. LEAVIS, FICTION AND THE READING PUBLIC 33–34 (1932). 
216 See generally, PATRICK BRANTLINGER, THE READING LESSON: THE THREAT OF MASS LITERACY IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH FICTION (Indiana Univ. Press 1998).  
217 James F. Stephen, Railroad Bookselling, III SATURDAY REVIEW 100 (Jan. 31, 1857).  
218 STEPHEN, supra note 212, at 145.  
DRAFT 
46 
 
probable effects of the royalty scheme.219 Thus, the goal of cheapening books should not be 
the deciding factor in forming copyright policy. There is some evidence to suggest that 
Fitzjames Stephen and Spencer might have had a point. As books became cheaper, and as the 
circulating library fell out of fashion, it became more difficult for serious literature to find a 
publisher.220  
Fitzjames Stephen and Farrer were old enemies, and he pressed the civil servant to 
admit that the royalty proposal was not currently a feasible proposition in Britain.221 Yet, 
despite his personal animosity towards Farrer and his doubts regarding the royalty scheme 
proposed by the Board of Trade, some of the arguments regarding the scope of copyright 
resonated with Fitzjames Stephen. While he was unconvinced by the unsophisticated 
extremist free-market doctrine of the Cobdenites and others, his essentially utilitarian view of 
the nature of property and copyright was closer to that of Farrer and Mallet than that of 
Spencer and Huxley. He saw the ability to acquire property as a fundamental, necessary, and 
“universally recognised” item of liberty, which was essentially incompatible with doctrines of 
equality.222 Property was a necessary encouragement for men to pursue valuable labour, not 
the result of  men’s  natural  rights  to  reap  the  fruits  of  their  labours  in  the  Lockean  model. 
In keeping with his positivist, utilitarian approach to property rights, Fitzjames 
Stephen believed  that  copyright  had  to  “be regulated only by general expediency” and did not 
think   that   the   law   could   “lay   down   abstract   rules   about   a   man’s   abstract   right   in   the  
productions of his own  mind.”223 Similar to Mallet and Farrer, he supported a subjective 
theory of value. Nevertheless, despite his rejection of copyright as the recognition of an 
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authorial, natural right, and his agreement with Mallet and Farrer on value theory, he came to 
a distinctly different conclusion as to the economic necessity for copyright.  
 In terms of the aims of his writing, Jenkins was a novelist of the same sentimental, 
socially progressive stripe as Reade or Dickens. His anonymously-published novel Ginx’s  
Baby (1870) had satirized official neglect of poor children and helped to raise interest in the 
1870 Education Act. The novel exemplified   the   kind   of   literature   that   Stephen   ‘cordially  
despised’;;   he   believed   its   morality   ‘that of   Dickens’s   “Christmas   Carol,” and thought its 
political  aim  was  that  of  “sentimental socialism.”224  
Jenkins and Fitzjames Stephen had a fraught relationship, which stemmed not only 
from their literary differences, but also from a former political rivalry. Both men were 
members of the Liberal Party, but the radical Canadian and the old Etonian were poles apart 
on most topics. Fitzjames Stephen had sought to be the Liberal candidate for the safe seat of 
Dundee  in  the  1874  election,  but  it  was  Jenkins  with  his  ‘unctuous  philanthropic  enthusiasm’,  
who gained the candidacy and the seat.225 A local campaign paper sympathetic to Fitzjames 
Stephen’s  candidacy  described  his  liberalism  as  ‘the  liberalism  of  self-help’  and  Jenkins’s  as  
that  of  ‘state  aid,  of  self-abasement,  of  incapacity  and  indolence’.226 Such publicity probably 
did not help Fitjames Stephen’s  cause  much;;  Dundee  wanted  a  true  radical,  and  Jenkins,  an  
ardent pro-imperialist with a socialist bent, fitted the bill and won the seat. 
Fitzjames   Stephen’s   distrust   of   principles   of   liberty   and   democracy   are   clearly  
reflected in his contributions to the Royal Commission on Copyright. He signed the Report, 
but included a note appended to his signature.  In this note, he recorded his disagreement 
from the Commission recommendations regarding abridgements, the right of dramatizing 
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novels, and copying of pictures and statues.  While acknowledging copyright as a proprietary 
right, he thought that it needed to be extremely limited in scope--protection should not be 
extended to abridgements and adaptations. As to the objection that inept dramatisations of 
novels might harm the reputation of the novel and its author, he was of the opinion that 
“artistic reputation is too delicate a matter to be made the subject of legal protection.” 227 In 
his view, financial interests were the only interests that copyright ought to protect; moreover, 
the only financial interest that copyright ought to protect was the interest in preventing 
competing   direct   facsimile   copying.   Mallet’s   separate   report   concurred   with   Fitzjames 
Stephen on the subject of dramatising novels and extending copyrights in works of art.228 
Allowing the market to govern the value of literary works presented distinct 
difficulties. Fitzjames Stephen recognized the challenge of trying to determine the value of 
books, engravings, photographs, and other works where the work itself has no clear pre-
publication value and mass mechanical reproduction is possible.  The market value of the 
book cannot be ascertained until it has been placed on the market; once it has been placed on 
the market it is too late to harness any of that value for the producer in the absence of some 
form of legal protection. Copyright could provide that necessary post-publication protection.  
“I approve of copyright in books,”  explained  Fitzjames Stephen,  “because the MS has 
no money value until it is printed, and because when it has been printed, every copy is of 
equal value, so that unless a copyright existed the author of the most valuable work would 
have no  money  reward  for  writing  it.”229 Consistent with his value theory, he did not approve 
of protecting with copyright works which had intrinsic value as physical objects, such as 
paintings and statues. In the case of a painting, the artist would receive the market value for 
the painting upon first sale. Subsequent copies would be of negligible value, and the original 
work retained its value.  It was, of course, also much more difficult to copy a painting than a 
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book.   In   an   article   published   shortly   after   the   Commission’s   Report,   Farrer   approved   of  
Fitzjames Stephen’s   distinction   between   different   kinds   of   works   with   “a sensible market 
value” and those which could be reproduced easily and cheaply.230 With some prescience, he 
raised the problem that scientific advancements could pose to Fitzjames Stephen’s  
distinction;;   “modern science tends to facilitate reproduction of all sorts of things, and that 
almost all subjects of copyright can be mechanically reproduced with more or less ease and 
cheapness.”231 While politically, they were far apart, and personally, they were enemies, 
Farrer and Fitzjames Stephen’s  approaches to copyright policy are intriguingly similar.   
   
Conclusion 
 Although politicians, economists, and authors--and plenty of Victorians were all 
three--strove to fit copyright law into broader theories, questions of copyright policy and 
reform did not enter the realm of party politics as such.232 As  Scrutton  explained  “the reform 
of  the  Copyright  laws  is  not  a  ‘party question’ and authors are not deemed to have votes.”233  
The Copyright Commission illustrates how individuals with similar political and economic 
views could disagree about exactly where copyright and other kinds of intellectual property 
fell within the framework of their ideologies and how those with opposing political views 
could find common ground in their approach to copyright. In 1883, the economist Henry 
Sidgwick also noted the dilemma faced by those attempting to apply classical economic 
principles to copyright law.  
A different kind of problem has somewhat perplexed and divided the adherents of 
natural liberty in respect of property in the results of intellectual labour. On the one 
hand it has seemed clear that the man who works with his brain has as much right to 
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have the fruits of his labour secured to him as the man who works with his hands. On 
the other hand since the only effective way of protecting such fruits is to prohibit 
imitation on the part of others, it is not surprising that this very exceptional 
interference with the freedom of action of those others should have been thought by 
some persons to conflict with the principles of natural liberty.234  
 
 For writers like Scrutton and Sidgwick in the 1880s, the Commission’s   debates 
brought this complicated relationship between copyright and political economic thought to 
the fore. It is a paradox that attracts insufficient attention today.  Fundamental philosophical 
differences about the purpose of copyright law and the empirical challenges presented by 
assessment of its effects, for good or ill, still make it difficult to assign copyright a role within 
larger political or economic frameworks. Moreover, the question of copyright law was often 
viewed as rather difficult, esoteric, and, ultimately, perhaps just not as important as other 
political  and  economic  questions  of  the  day.  In  consequence,  disagreement  about  copyright’s  
normative foundations and the complexity of its application created surprising allies and 
enemies. The fact that the great minds the nineteenth century had difficulty placing debates 
over copyright firmly into prevailing economic theories and political agendas provides 
another compelling reason why the royalty proposals must be set within the context of such 
theories and agendas in order to be understood.  
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